Self-Selection and Wage-Tenure Profiles for Heterogeneous Labor
In this paper I develop a theoretical model explaining optimal wage-tenure profiles for heterogeneous labor. My findings entail that high productive people have steeper profiles than low productive individuals. I find strong empirical evidence for these findings. At the end of my paper, I utilize the basic model to describe the labor market entry of college graduates.
|Date of creation:||16 Sep 2004|
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