Optimal Income Taxation with a Risky Asset – The Triple Income Tax
We show in a two-period world with endogenous savings and two assets, one of them exhibiting a stochastic return that an interest adjusted income tax is optimal. This tax leaves a safe component of interest income tax free and taxes the excess return with a special tax rate. There is no trade off between risk allocation and efficiency in intertemporal consumption. Both goals are reached. As the resulting tax system divides income into three parts, the tax can also be called a triple income tax. This distinction and a special tax rate on the excess return is necessary in order to have an optimal risk shifting effect.
|Date of creation:||15 Dec 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Fach D 147, D-78457 Konstanz|
Web page: http://cofe.uni-konstanz.de
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://cofe.uni-konstanz.de Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kaplow, Louis, 1994. "Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 47(4), pages 789-98, December.
- Peter Sørensen, 2005. "Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(6), pages 777-801, November.
- Louis Kaplow, 1991. "Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective," NBER Working Papers 3709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Sørensen, 1994. "From the global income tax to the dual income tax: Recent tax reforms in the Nordic countries," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(1), pages 57-79, February.
- Wolfram F. RICHTER & Wolfgang WIEGARD, 1991. "On the Diferrence between Income and Consumption Taxes when the Return to Savings is uncertain," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1991044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
- Vidar Christiansen, 1993. "A Normative Analysis of Capital Income Taxes in the Presence of Aggregate Risk," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(1), pages 55-76, June.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, 1982.
"The Taxation of Risky Assets,"
NBER Working Papers
0897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sandmo, Agnar, 1985. "The effects of taxation on savings and risk taking," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 265-311 Elsevier.
- Roger H. Gordon, 1985. "Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax Distortions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 1-27.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Rosen, Harvey S., 1980. "Labor supply, uncertainty, and efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 365-374, December.
- Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, 1980. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 95(2), pages 357-364.
- Wolfram Richter, 1992. "The optimal taxation of risky capital income: An elasticity rule," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 101-111, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:knz:cofedp:0311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ingmar Nolte)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.