Regulierung vertikal strukturierter Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaftschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik
This paper deals with the efficiency characteristics of alternative regulatory policies in the electricity sector. The analysis begins with the presentation of the analytical concept of the ?regulatory contract, which is based on the New Institutional Economics. The main part of the paper deals with the regulatory implications of the technical characteristics of the electricity supply industry. Firstly, it analyses optimal rules for regulating the price-level and the pricestructure. Secondly, the consequences of asymmetric information between Regulator and regulated firms are scrutinised. These informational asymmetries are of particular importance in the case of vertically integrated electricity companies. Several measures to improve the informational Situation of the regulator are discussed. The paper concludes with a summary of the main results.
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