IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik

  • Kumkar, Lars
Registered author(s):

    This paper deals with the efficiency characteristics of alternative governance structures in the electricity sector. The analysis begins with the description of some technical aspects of the electricity supply industry. The goal is to identify the main co-ordination tasks within, and between the different production stages. The paper goes on to present the analytical framework for the following analysis, which is based on the New Institutional Economics. The central part of the paper deals with the institutional implications of the technical characteristics, particularly regarding the private incentives to establish efflcient governance structures in the electricity sector. Furthermore, the welfare implications of the resulting governance structures are analysed. The paper concludes with a summary of the main results.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/46885/1/258297778.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 873.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:873
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
    Phone: +49 431 8814-1
    Fax: +49 431 85853
    Web page: http://www.ifw-kiel.de
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-40, CIRANO.
    2. Warren-Boulton, Frederick R, 1974. "Vertical Control with Variable Proportions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 783-802, July/Aug..
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
    4. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    5. Waterson, Michael, 1982. "Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and Oligopoly," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(365), pages 129-44, March.
    6. Paul L. Joskow & Donald R. Jones, 1983. "The Simple Economics of Industrial Cogeneration," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-22.
    7. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
    8. Massimo Filippini, 1995. "Swiss Residential Demand for Electricity by Time-of-Use: An Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 27-40.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," IDEI Working Papers 22, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    10. Reiffen, David, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 694-97, June.
    11. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
    12. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-62, December.
    13. Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," NBER Working Papers 2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521451895 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Telser, Lester G, 1981. "Why There Are Organized Futures Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 1-22, April.
    16. Wesley C. Mitchell, 1910. "The Rationality of Economic Activity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18, pages 197.
    17. Schmalensee, Richard, 1973. "A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 442-49, Part I, M.
    18. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
    19. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
    20. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    21. Masten, Scott E, 1988. "A Legal Basis for the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 181-98, Spring.
    22. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Joskow, Paul L, 1991. "The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 53-83, Special I.
    24. Patrick DeGraba, 1996. "Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 433-447, 09.
    25. Ulf Hansen, 1998. "Technological Options for Power Generation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 63-87.
    26. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    27. Perry, Martin K & Groff, Robert H, 1985. "Resale Price Maintenance and Forward Integration into a Monopolistically Competitive Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1293-1311, November.
    28. Dixit, Avinash, 1983. "Vertical integration in a monopolistically competitive industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 63-78, March.
    29. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
    30. Wayne Crews, Clyde, 1997. "Electric utility reform: The free market alternative to mandatory open access," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(10), pages 32-43, December.
    31. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
    32. Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May.
    33. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr.
    34. Dewatripont, Mathias, 1989. "Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 589-619, August.
    35. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    36. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 201-28, Fall.
    37. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations," Working papers 441, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    38. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
    39. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Working Papers 728, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    40. Patrick de Graba, 1996. "Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 565-579, December.
    41. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
    42. Nicholas Economides, 1997. "The Economics of Networks," Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, vol. 1(0), December.
    43. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Working papers 448, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    44. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 473-94, July.
    45. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    46. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347.
    47. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-95.
    48. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    49. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
    50. De Alessi, Louis, 1983. "Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 64-81, March.
    51. Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 1993. "Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-Term Contracting in Natural Gas," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 380-98, October.
    52. Mathewson, G F & Winter, R A, 1983. "Vertical Integration by Contractual Restraints in Spatial Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 497-517, October.
    53. Westfield, Fred M, 1981. "Vertical Integration: Does Product Price Rise or Fall?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 334-46, June.
    54. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-53.
    55. Peterman, John L, 1975. "The Brown Shoe Case," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 81-146, April.
    56. Edward Kahn & Ross Baldick, 1994. "Reactive Power is a Cheap Constraint," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 191-202.
    57. Oliver Williamson, 1984. "The incentive limits of firms: A comparative institutional assessment of bureaucracy," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 120(4), pages 736-763, December.
    58. Liston, Catherine, 1993. "Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 25-48, March.
    59. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March.
    60. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213.
    61. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    62. William G. Shepherd, 1988. "Entry barriers, contestability, and predatory pricing," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(1), pages 1-20.
    63. Allen, Bruce T, 1971. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure: The Case of Cement and Concrete," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 251-74, April.
    64. Nabli, Mustapha K. & Nugent, Jeffrey B., 1989. "The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1333-1347, September.
    65. Aghion, P. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1990. "On renegotiation design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 322-329, May.
    66. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, March.
    67. Vernon, John M & Graham, Daniel A, 1971. "Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 924-25, July-Aug..
    68. North, Douglass C., 1984. "Government and the Cost of Exchange in History," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(02), pages 255-264, June.
    69. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:873. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dieter Stribny)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.