Wie privatisieren und wer privatisiert? Zur Erklärung der Wahl der Privatisierungsmethode und -organisation
With this theoretical survey the thesis is put forward that the method of privatization as well as the structure of the privatization agency is choosen by the politicians for politico-economic reasons, and not for reasons of saving transaction costs or for reasons of ideological preferences. The method of privatization (auction, bargaining, giveaway) is the one that is choosen which secures power for the politician. And the agency of privatization is structured according to the juridical power and political structure of the State.
|Date of creation:||1997|
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CEPR Discussion Papers
1541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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