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On international compensations for environmental stocks

  • Stähler, Frank

This paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that serious complications can arise if the resource-owner can vary the compensation price. In that case, extraction-driven stock preservation policies can conflict with compensation-driven ones and imply instability. Whether compensation policies can neglect this aspect depends crucially on the credibility of sticky compensation prices.

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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 580.

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Date of creation: 1993
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Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:580
Contact details of provider: Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
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  1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521297615 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Stahler, Frank, 1994. "Biological diversity: The international management of genetic resources and its impact on biotechnology," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 227-236, December.
  3. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
  4. William D. Nordhaus, 1973. "The Allocation of Energy Resources," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 4(3), pages 529-576.
  5. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  6. Stähler, Frank, 1992. "Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers," Kiel Working Papers 541, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  7. Mohr, Ernst & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1998. "Pooling sovereign risks: The case of environmental treaties and international debt," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 173-190, February.
  8. Mohr, Ernst, 1993. "Sustainable development and international distribution: Theory and application to rainforests as carbon sinks," Kiel Working Papers 602, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  9. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  10. Nunnenkamp, Peter, 1992. "International financing of environmental protection: North-South conflicts on concepts and financial instruments and possible solutions," Kiel Working Papers 512, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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