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Who will win the ozone game? On building and sustaining cooperation in the Montreal protocoll on substances that deplete the ozone layer

  • Heister, Johannes
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    This paper presents an analysis of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It advances the view that the Developing World did not exploit its relatively strong bargaining position in negotiations over sidepayments and that the concessional ten-year grace period for Jess developed countries is a cause of instability of the agreement. The paper derives conditions under which sidepayments and sanctions can produce stable cooperation. It applies basic non-cooperative game theory and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as solution concept and compares the non-cooperative outcome with the Nash bargaining solution of a hypothetical cooperative game.

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    Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 579.

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    Date of creation: 1993
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:579
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
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    1. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    2. Heister, Johannes & Klepper, Gernot & Stähler, Frank, 1992. "Strategien globaler Umweltpolitik: die UNCED-Konferenz aus ökonomischer Sicht," Kiel Working Papers 519, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    3. Douglas A. Smith & Keith Vodden, 1989. "Global Environmental Policy: The Case of Ozone Depletion," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 15(4), pages 413-423, December.
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