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Environmental legislation and the impact of lobbying activities

  • Bartsch, Elga
  • Thomas, Ingo
  • Rauscher, Michael
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    The paper is concerned with effects of lobbying activities by political pressure groups that wish to affect environmental legislation. Two interest groups are considered, environmentalists on the one hand and a polluters' lobby on the other. These two groups can influence the environmental policy in two ways. First, they support those political parties that promise to implement their favoured kind of environmental regulation. This support has an impact on election probabilities and, therefore, on the environmental policy measures implemented by the new government. The second way of influencing political decisions is to exert pressure on an existing government. These two approaches are used in the paper to address the questions of how environmental quality is affected by lobbying activities and how large the resource waste due to lobbying is.

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    Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 562.

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    Date of creation: 1993
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:562
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    1. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
    2. Maloney, Michael T & McCormick, Robert E, 1982. "A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 99-123, April.
    3. Downing, Paul B., 1981. "A political economy model of implementing pollution laws," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 255-271, September.
    4. Delorme, Charles D, Jr & Snow, Arthur, 1990. "On the Limits to Rent-Seeking Waste," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 129-54, November.
    5. Pethig, Rudiger, 1988. "Microfoundations of pressure group competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 263-283.
    6. David Austen-Smith, 1987. "Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 123-139, January.
    7. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2004. "Political Economy of Antitrust," Chapters, in: The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Lee, Dwight R & Wilson, Paul W, 1991. "Efficient User Charges in a Rent-Seeking Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(2), pages 367-74, April.
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