Economic policy making and the role of special interest groups: Some evidence for South Korea
It is now generally recognized that special interest group influence on economic decision making is not in theory a phenomenon restricted to democratic capitalism. Governments which have attained power by non-democratic means must eventually seek legitimacy, either by populist appeals to the masses or by cultivating the support of important sectors (e.g. Lovell (1975)). They may therefore be no less immune to interest group lobbying than governments which face electoral scrutiny. Likewise, it has been argued that the incentive for interest groups to exert political pressure is in fact greater under socialism than under capitalism (e.g. Becker (1983)). The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the role of special interest groups in economic policy making in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a country which differs from a western capitalist democracy in at least one important respect.
|Date of creation:||1984|
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Dee, Philippa S., 1984.
"Will bank interest rate deregulation jeopardize economic growth? A case study of South Korea,"
Kiel Working Papers
203, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Dee, Philippa S., 1984. "Will bank interest rate deregulation jeopardize economic growth? A case study of South Korea," Kiel Working Papers 203, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
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