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The Use of Collateral in Formal and Informal Lending

  • Carmen Kislat
  • Lukas Menkhoff
  • Doris Neuberger

Apart from altruistic reasons, NGOs may engage in developing countries under conditions of conflict and war in order to secure funding and survive in the ‘market’ of humanitarian relief and development assistance. Applying a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach, we analyze empirically whether the presence of US-based NGOs in Afghanistan and Iraq improved their chances of external funding. We find that NGOs being active in Afghanistan tended to benefit from easier access to official sources of funding after the US intervention, compared to NGOs staying away. Nevertheless, there is no compelling evidence that it pays for NGOs to engage where the United States intervenes militarily

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File URL: https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/the-use-of-collateral-in-formal-and-informal-lending/KWP-1879.pdf
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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1879.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1879
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