IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Government Ideology in Donor and Recipient Countries: Does Political Proximity Matter for the Effectiveness of Aid?

  • Axel Dreher
  • Anna Minasyan
  • Peter Nunnenkamp

Political proximity between donor and recipient governments may impair the effectiveness of aid by encouraging favoritism. By contrast, political misalignment between donor and recipient governments may render aid less effective by adding to transaction costs and giving rise to incentive problems. We test these competing hypotheses empirically by considering the political ideology of both governments along the left-right spectrum in augmented models on the economic growth effects of aid. Following the estimation approach of Clemens et al. (2012), we find that aid tends to be less effective when political ideology differs between the donor and the recipient

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/government-ideology-in-donor-and-recipient-countries-does-political-proximity-matter-for-the-effectiveness-of-aid/KWP_1870.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1870.

as
in new window

Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1870
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel

Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 85853
Web page: http://www.ifw-kiel.de
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. repec:wbk:wbpubs:12425 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Wacziarg, Romain & Welch, Karen Horn, 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," Research Papers 1826, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Easterly, W & Levine, R, 1996. "Africa's Growth Tragedy : Policies and Ethnic Divisions," Papers 536, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
  4. Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 728, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Minoiu, Camelia & Reddy, Sanjay G., 2010. "Development aid and economic growth: A positive long-run relation," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 27-39, February.
  6. Nizalova, Olena Y. & Murtazashvili, Irina, 2012. "Exogenous Treatment and Endogenous Factors: Vanishing of Omitted Variable Bias on the Interaction Term," IZA Discussion Papers 6282, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Andreas Fuchs & Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2012. "Determinants of Donor Generosity: A Survey of the Aid Budget Literature," Kiel Working Papers 1789, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  8. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
  9. Viktor Brech & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Donor Ideology and Types of Foreign Aid," CESifo Working Paper Series 4314, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Michael Faye & Paul Niehaus, 2012. "Political Aid Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3516-30, December.
  11. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2007. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," KOF Working papers 07-171, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  12. Knack,Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2004. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3186, The World Bank.
  13. Hristos Doucouliagos & Martin Paldam, 2009. "The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results Of 40 Years Of Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 433-461, 07.
  14. Kilby, Christopher, 2013. "The political economy of project preparation: An empirical analysis of World Bank projects," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 211-225.
  15. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
  16. Matteo Bobba & Andrew Powell, 2007. "Aid Effectiveness: Politics Matters," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6725, Inter-American Development Bank.
  17. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  18. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "How Do Political Changes Influence US Bilateral Aid Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 210-223, 05.
  19. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.
  20. Christopher Kilby, 2012. "Assessing the contribution of donor agencies to aid effectiveness: The impact of World Bank preparation on project outcomes," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 20, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
  21. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
  22. Nunn, Nathan & Qian, Nancy, 2012. "Aiding Conflict: The Impact of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War," CEPR Discussion Papers 8799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," NBER Working Papers 6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, 2011. "Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 2021-2031.
  25. Dreher, Axel & Eichenauer, Vera & Gehring, Kai, 2014. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 9904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Torsvik, Gaute, 2005. "Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 503-515, August.
  27. Arnab Acharya & Ana Teresa Fuzzo de Lima & Mick Moore, 2006. "Proliferation and fragmentation: Transactions costs and the value of aid," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 1-21.
  28. Michael A. Clemens & Steven Radelet & Rikhil R. Bhavnani & Samuel Bazzi, 2012. "Counting Chickens when they Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(561), pages 590-617, 06.
  29. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
  30. World Bank, 2005. "World Development Indicators 2005," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 12426, February.
  31. Derek Headey, 2008. "Geopolitics and the effect of foreign aid on economic growth: 1970-2001," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 161-180.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1870. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dieter Stribny)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Dieter Stribny to update the entry or send us the correct email address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.