Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes
This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalistÂ’s incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2002|
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- Christian Keuschnigg & Søren Bo Nielsen, .
"Public Policy for Venture Capital,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
01-06, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Schmidt, Klaus M., 2003.
"Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance,"
Munich Reprints in Economics
19769, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, 06.
- Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klaus Schmidt, 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series 217, CESifo Group Munich.
- Brav, Alon & Gompers, Paul A, 1997. " Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1791-1821, December.
- Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. " Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
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