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Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung � Das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs

  • Hans H. Glismann
  • Klaus Schrader
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    Im Rahmen eines Vergleichs der amerikanischen und britischen Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung wird gezeigt, daß das amerikanische System, auch anders als das deutsche, eine negative Rückkopplung zwischen den Ausgaben für die Arbeitslosenversicherung und der Höhe der Freisetzung von Arbeitskräften aufweist ("experience rating"). Im Vereinigten Königreich gibt es keine Arbeitslosenversicherung im herkömmlichen Sinne: Die Einkommenssicherung bei Arbeitslosigkeit erfolgt durch die "National Insurance", die das gesamte System der sozialen Sicherung (einschließlich Gesundheitswesen und Alterssicherung) abdeckt. Als bemerkenswert wird herausgestellt, daß anders als etwa die vergleichbaren Analysen der deutschen Arbeitslosenversicherung — die sich vorwiegend mit der Angebotsseite des Arbeitsmarktes befassen — die amerikanische Literatur zu einem großen Teil an der Nachfrage nach Arbeit ansetzt. Comparing the unemployment insurance systems of the United States and of the United Kingdom it is shown that the US unemployment insurance (UI) is the only system that provides for a negative feedback between UI expenditures and layoffs ("experience rating"). The UK has no specific UI: Unemployment benefits are paid by the "National Insurance" which also covers other elements of social security, such as health care and retirement payments. Focussing therefore on the US literature it turns out that a major part deals with the demand side of the labour market, whereas the German literature rather concentrates on the supply side.

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    Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 1032.

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    Length: 54 pages
    Date of creation: Mar 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:1032
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