IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Europe's Revolving Doors: Import Competition and Endogenous Firm Entry Institutions

  • Povilas Lastauskas

The close relationship between politics and enterprises made the revolving door wide open and reinforced business influence on political decisions. The paper analyses relationship between firm entry institutions and import competition inside the EU. Though there is a clear tendency for entry and startup costs to decrease over time and particularly in space, I challenge the view that greater openness to trade automatically leads to improved firm entry institutions. My model enables calculating business entry impediments whereas lobbying game produces structural estimates of the counterfactual levels of trade, prices and earnings had no business obstacles existed. Conditions for active entry barriers are laid down in terms of extensive margin and asymmetries in technology and trade costs. Importantly, the model demonstrates that startling differences in firm regulation can be explained resorting to relative gains and losses accruing in a fully trading network as is the EU. More generally, understanding factors which affect imports is crucial for any model seeking to uncover ex ante welfare effects of trade

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Advanced Studies Working Papers with number 464.

in new window

Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieasw:464
Contact details of provider: Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 85853
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Magee, Christopher, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 449-471, August.
  2. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Jung, Benjamin & Larch, Mario, 2013. "Icebergs versus tariffs: A quantitative perspective on the gains from trade," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 53, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
  3. Novy, Dennis, 2008. "Gravity Redux : Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 861, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Elhanan Helpman & Oleg Itskhoki & Stephen Redding, 2009. "Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy," CEP Discussion Papers dp0940, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  5. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2009. "Selecting equilibria in common agency games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 604-634, March.
  6. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 2001. "The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 339-412 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Gregory Corcos & Massimo Del Gatto & Giordano Mion & Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano, 2011. "Productivity and firm selection: quantifying the ‘new’ gains from trade," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 42684, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
  9. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2001. "Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 8079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 574-601, June.
  11. Chen, Natalie & Novy, Dennis, 2011. "Gravity, trade integration, and heterogeneity across industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 206-221.
  12. Ina Simonovska & Michael E. Waugh, 2011. "The Elasticity of Trade: Estimates and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 16796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Arnaud Costinot, 2009. "An Elementary Theory of Comparative Advantage," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1165-1192, 07.
  14. Simonovska, Ina; Waugh, Michael E., 2010. "The Elasticity of Trade: Estimates & Evidence," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 13, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  15. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Larch, Mario & Lechthaler, Wolfgang, 2012. "Endogenous labor market institutions in an open economy," Munich Reprints in Economics 20600, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  16. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
  17. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  18. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  19. Vincent Rebeyrol & Julien Vauday, 2008. "Live or let die : intra-sectoral lobbying on entry," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00282331, HAL.
  20. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
  21. Jennifer Abel-Koch, 2013. "Endogenous Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 1306, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
  22. Edward J. Balistreri & Russell H. Hillberry & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2008. "Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1056, The University of Melbourne.
  23. Rubinstein, Yona & Helpman, Elhanan & Melitz, Marc, 2008. "Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes," Scholarly Articles 3228230, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  24. Novy, Dennis, 2006. "Is the Iceberg Melting Less Quickly? International Trade Costs after World War II," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 764, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  25. World Bank, 2008. "World Development Indicators 2008," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 11855, September.
  26. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "Import Peneteration and the Politics of Trade Protection," NBER Working Papers 6711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. W.W. Sharkey, 1982. "Suggestions for a Game-Theoretic Approach to Public Utility Pricing and Cost Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 57-68, Spring.
  28. Pesaran, M. Hashem & Smith, Ron, 1995. "Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous panels," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 79-113, July.
  29. Fergal McCann, 2009. "Importing, exporting and productivity in Irish manufacturing," Working Papers 200922, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
  30. Kristian Behrens & Cem Ertur & Wilfried Koch, 2007. "Dual' gravity: Using spatial econometrics to control for multilateral resistance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-501, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  31. David S. Jacks & Christopher M. Meissner & Dennis Novy, 2008. "Trade Costs, 1870-2000," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 529-34, May.
  32. Hopenhayn, Hugo A, 1992. "Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1127-50, September.
  33. Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2006. "Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3836, The World Bank.
  34. Costas Arkolakis & Arnaud Costinot & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 2009. "New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?," NBER Working Papers 15628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. Roberts, Mark J & Tybout, James R, 1997. "The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 545-64, September.
  36. Daron Acemoglu, 2010. "Theory, General Equilibrium and Political Economy in Development Economics," NBER Working Papers 15944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Roger Smeets & Harold Creusen & Arjan Lejour & Henk Kox, 2010. "Export margins and export barriers: uncovering market entry costs of exporters in the Netherlands," CPB Document 208, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  38. Francesco Trebbi & Matilde Bombardini, 2008. "Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy," 2008 Meeting Papers 458, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kie:kieasw:464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dieter Stribny)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.