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Ökonomische Analyse der Modernisierungsanreize im deutschen Mietrecht


  • Johannes Ruhland

    () (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsinformatik)

  • Christian Alexander Kreibich

    () (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Institut für Energiewirtschaftsrecht,)

  • Ralf Herud

    () (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsinformatik)


Die deutsche Wohnungswirtschaft unterliegt einer tiefgreifenden staatlichen Regulierung. Hiervon sind insbesondere Heizungsanlagen betroffen. Durch die vorgeschriebene Aufteilung in Kaltmiete und Nebenkosten stellt sich die Investition in eine neue, effiziente Heizungsanlage für den Vermieter als nicht mehr wirtschaftlich dar. Auch die vom Gesetzgeber eingeräumte Möglichkeit, einen Teil der Investitionskosten jährlich auf den Mieter umzulegen, vermag den Modernisierungsstau nicht zu überwinden, wie empirische Daten zeigen. Der Beitrag untersucht vor diesem Hintergrund die Wirkung der gesetzlichen Modernisierungsanreize aus betriebswirtschaftlicher und spieltheoretischer Sicht. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass der momentane Modernisierungsstau eine plausible Folge rationalen Handelns aller Marktakteure ist. Summary: German residential leases and their associated fringe costs such as heating are subject to strict regulations. Because of the mandatory rental cost allocation into basic rent and associated costs, investments in new and efficient heating systems turned out to be no longer economical for landlords. In order to still ensure a high efficiency level of heating systems, the legislator gives landlords the opportunity to pass on some of the investment costs annually to tenants. Nevertheless, as shown by empirical data, the backlog of modernization has not been over- come yet. Against this background, we analyse the impact of the current statutory incentives for modernization from an economic and game theoretic point of view. It can be shown that the existing backlog of modernization is a plausible consequence of rational behavior of all market actors. Key words: Tenancy law, Modernization incentives, Regulation, Housing industry, Energy efficiency, Free rider problem, Game theory

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Ruhland & Christian Alexander Kreibich & Ralf Herud, 2010. "Ökonomische Analyse der Modernisierungsanreize im deutschen Mietrecht," Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics - Working and Discussion Papers (Expired!) 04/2010, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, School of Economics and Business Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:jen:jenjbe:2010-04

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Scholl, Armin, 2000. "Robuste Planung und Optimierung: Grundlagen, Konzepte und Methoden; experimentelle Untersuchungen," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 9373, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
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    Mietrecht; Modernisierungsanreize; Regulierung; Wohnungswirtschaft; Energieeffizienz; Free-Rider-Problem; Spieltheorie;

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