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European competition policy modernization: from notification to legal exception

  • Frederic Loss

    (Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers)

  • Estelle Malavolti-Grimal

    (Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien, Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique)

  • Fabian Berges

    ()

    (Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative, INRA)

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other hand, the notification system becomes optimal when the competition authority's probability of error is high. The paper also shows that block exemptions and black list (regimes of per se (il)legality) should be implemented when the agreements’ expected welfare impact is very high and very low, respectively.

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Paper provided by Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France in its series Working Papers with number 22644.

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Length: 77-98
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Economic Review
Handle: RePEc:inr:wpaper:22644
Note: JEL : L4 ; D8
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  1. Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
  2. Winand Emons, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0315, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  3. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-25, June.
  4. Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  5. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 447-470, Winter.
  6. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
  7. Petros C. MAVROIDIS & Damien J. NEVEN, 2000. "The Modernisation of EU Competition Policy : Making the Network Operate," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  8. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
  9. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
  10. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
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