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Point-record driving licence and road safety: an economic approach

  • Jean Marc Bourgeon

    ()

    (Economie Publique, INRA)

  • Pierre Picard

    (Ecole Polytechnique)

Beaucoup de pays ont adoptés des systèmes de permis de conduire à points où les infractions au code de la route font l'objet d'un décompte de points, avec une grande variété de mises en oeuvre. Le retrait de permis est une sanction non-monétaire qui permet au gouvernement de frapper d'incapacité des individus dangereux et qui dissuade aussi la plupart des conducteurs de violer la législation. Les auteurs examinent les dispositifs désirables de ces mécanismes à points et, en particulier, s'il convient de permettre aux conducteurs de récupérer des points et/ou de prévoir une période d'essai pour les conducteurs novices. Ils analysent aussi la complémentarité de ces mécanismes à points avec des amendes et considèrent la possibilité d'un retrait immédiat du permis de conduire pour des violations très graves au code de la route.

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Paper provided by Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France in its series Working Papers with number 17820.

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Length: 235-258
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economics
Handle: RePEc:inr:wpaper:17820
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  1. Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Hu, Sheng-cheng & Huang, Ting-yuan, 2000. "Punishing repeat offenders more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 127-140, March.
  2. Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1985. "The Economics of Road Safety," Cahiers de recherche 8554, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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  7. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable," NBER Working Papers 10761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
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  12. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "A Model of Optimal Incapacitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 107-10, May.
  13. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September.
  14. Emons, Winand, 2003. "A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-259, September.
  15. Blackmon, B Glenn, Jr & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1991. "Mispriced Equity: Regulated Rates for Auto Insurance in Massachusetts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 65-69, May.
  16. Landes, Elisabeth M, 1982. "Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 49-65, April.
  17. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
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