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Mechanism design with two alternatives in Quasi-linear environment

Author

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  • Thierry Marchant

    () (Ghent University)

  • Debasis Mishra

    () (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

Abstract

We study mechanism design in quasi-linear environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable deterministic allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. In unbounded domains, if we replace our range condition by an independence condition, then every implementable deterministic allocation rule is an affine maximizer. Our results extend Roberts' affine maximizer theorem (Roberts, 1979) to the case of two alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Marchant & Debasis Mishra, 2012. "Mechanism design with two alternatives in Quasi-linear environment," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 12-05, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  • Handle: RePEc:ind:isipdp:12-05
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    File URL: http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/dispapers/dp12-05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Kohei Shiozawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms for Public Decision with Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0964, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. repec:eee:ejores:v:266:y:2018:i:3:p:1038-1043 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Debasis Mishra & Abdul Quadir, 2012. "Deterministic single object auctions with private values," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 12-06, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
    4. Abhinaba Lahiri & Anup Pramanik, 2017. "On Strategy-proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives," ISER Discussion Paper 1013, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Roberts theorem; dominant strategy mechanism design; affine maximizer; generalized utility function maximizer;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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