Does the market kill bad ideas? An institutional comparision of committees and markets in network industries
The paper analyzes the problem of protocol coordination between two firms, where one firm has private information about its own protocol. The institutional characteristics of the market and the class of strategies adopted by the firms admit multiple equilibria in the market. Of these, one particular equilibrium has an interior information revelation cutoff for the firm with private information. This demonstrates that the market might not be able to "kill bad ideas", but it does "reward good ideas". In contrast, the institutional design of the committee ensures that the same class of strategies gives rise to a unique equilibrium in the committee, with the informed firm revealing all private information. The committee game results generalize easily to multiple periods as well as to multiple firms and is robust to an exit option. The market game result holds for a certain range of parameter values for multiple firms.
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- Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1988.
"Coordination through Committees and Markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 235-252, Summer.
- Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner., 1987. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Economics Working Papers 8740, University of California at Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner., 1988. "Coordination through Committees and Markets," Economics Working Papers 8864, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1988. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt08w115vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5sn4b6v4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Elisabeth Schulte, 2010. "Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
- Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
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