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Marriage markets with externalities

Author

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  • Prabal Roy Chowdhury

    () (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

Abstract

This paper examines a marriage market with externality. We first develop an appropriate notion of stability for this market, called E-stability. We provide an example to show that an E-stable outcome need not exist. We then derive conditions under which an E-stable outcome exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Marriage markets with externalities," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-11, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  • Handle: RePEc:ind:isipdp:04-11
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    File URL: http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/dispapers/dp04-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882.
    2. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439.
    3. Prabal Ray Chaudhuri, 1997. "Generalized assignment models: with an applicationto technology transfer," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 335-360.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ismail Saglam & AyĆ¾e Mumcu, 2008. "Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(33), pages 1-8.
    2. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2010. "Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 154-159, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage model; stability; externalities;

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