Marriage markets with externalities
This paper examines a marriage market with externality. We first develop an appropriate notion of stability for this market, called E-stability. We provide an example to show that an E-stable outcome need not exist. We then derive conditions under which an E-stable outcome exists.
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- Sonmez, T., 1995.
"Implementation in Generalized Matching Problems,"
95-03, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
- Prabal Ray Chaudhuri, 1997. "Generalized assignment models: with an applicationto technology transfer," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 335-360.
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