Patronage in public administration: Presidential connections, position assignments and the performance of Korean public prosecutors, 1992-2000
Presidential elections in Korea in the eighties and nineties provide an opportunity to examine the role of political patronage in a newly formed democracy. We examine whether the bureaucratic reshuffling which accompanies presidential changes depends on the political connections of bureaucrats and whether bureaucratic reassignment is associated with changes in administrative performance. We use data on all public prosecutors in Korea between 1992-2000 and find that sharing birth and school environments with the incumbent president roughly doubled the odds of being assigned to a range of influential positions within the Public Prosecutor's Office. In the last of the three presidential regimes we consider, we also find that branch offices with high fractions of connected prosecutors performed poorly relative to other branches. Observations over multiple years allow us to control for unobservable characteristics of prosecutors and offices while estimating these effects of political patronage.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi - 110016|
Web page: http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, 2001.
"Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia,"
NBER Working Papers
8521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
- Gary Chamberlain, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 225-238.
- Euijune Kim & Kabsung Kim, 2002. "Impacts of regional development strategies on growth and equity of Korea: A multiregional CGE model," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 36(1), pages 165-180.
- Rebecca Menes, 2003. "Corruption in Cities: Graft and Politics in American Cities at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," NBER Working Papers 9990, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- G. S. Maddala, 1987. "Limited Dependent Variable Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 22(3), pages 307-338.
- Jayachandran, Seema, 2006.
"The Jeffords Effect,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 397-425, October.
- Wade, Robert, 1985. "The market for public office: Why the Indian state is not better at development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 467-497, April.
- Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ind:isipdp:04-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamprasad M. Pujar)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.