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Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes

Author

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  • Dipjyoti Majumdar

    (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

  • Arunava Sen

    () (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

Abstract

We study strategic voting after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthelling is required to maximize the expected utility being computed with respect to the voter's prior beliefs and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that for a special type of priors i.e., the uniform priors there exists a large class of social choice functions that are OBIC. However, for priors which are generic in the set of independent beliefs a social choice function is OBIC only if it is dictatorial. This result underlines the robustness of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 03-01, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  • Handle: RePEc:ind:isipdp:03-01
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    File URL: http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/dispapers/dp03-01.pdf
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    1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 291-303.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    2. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
    3. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2017. "Stability with one-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 372-399.

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