Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester & van Rooij, Maarten & Schaling, Eric, 1996.
"Central Bank Independence: A Paneldata Approach,"
Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 163-182, October.
- Eijffinger, S. & van Rool, M. & Schaling, E., 1994. "Central Bank Independence: A Panel Data Approach," Papers 9493, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & van Rooij, M. & Schaling, E., 1994. "Central bank independence : A paneldata approach," Discussion Paper 1994-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & van Rooij, M. & Schaling, E., 1996. "Central Bank Independence : A Panel Data Approach," Other publications TiSEM edfc8450-16c6-4539-be31-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Mangano, Gabriel, 1998. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 468-492, July.
- Manfred Gärtner, 1997. "Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio: The Dark Side of the Force," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(III), pages 513-538, September.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992.
"Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, January.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
- Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
- Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
- Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997.
"Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
- Prakash Loungani & Nathan Sheets, 1995. "Central bank independence, inflation and growth in transition economies," International Finance Discussion Papers 519, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
- Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-1448, November.
- Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
- Wolfgang HÄRDLE & J. MARRON & L. YANG, 1996. "Discussion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1996,65, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence; Issues and Experience," IMF Working Papers 91/58, International Monetary Fund.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008.
"Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
- Helge Berger & Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World; Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2007. "Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1897, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michael Berlemann & Kai Hielscher, 2013. "Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(3), pages 267-290, July.
More about this item
KeywordsMontenegro; Russian Federation; Central bank independence; transition economies; central bank; inflation; monetary policy; central banks; monetary fund;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CIS-2013-02-16 (Confederation of Independent States)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:99/4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.