Inflation Targeting; Theory and Policy Implications
As with many monetary policy frameworks, inflation targeting is subject to the well-known problem of inflation bias. With inflation targeting, however, the bias becomes apparent not as inflation above desired levels, but as a wedge between the announced target and observed inflation. This inconsistency could render the framework neither credible nor enforceable since the target is overshot on average. The problem can be addressed by assigning price stability as the single policy objective or by assigning a joint target for both inflation and output, provided that they are consistent. Many inflation targeting countries take the joint target approach implicitly through transparency measures which publicly assess monetary conditions in terms of potential output and output gaps.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:96/65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow)or (Hassan Zaidi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.