Varieties of Monetary Reforms
This paper surveys three types of monetary arrangements. It considers how the choice of an exchange rate regime, the degree of central bank independence, or choice of currency unions or boards depends not only on economic considerations but also on political economy considerations. In economic terms, the choice of monetary regime will depend on the policy that is best suited to reducing or stabilizing inflation. In political economy terms, the choice of monetary arrangement will ultimately depend on how independent a country wishes to be from shocks emanating from the rest of the world and the weight politicians attach to influencing economic conditions in their own country.
|Date of creation:||01 May 1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:94/57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow)or (Hassan Zaidi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.