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Lost and Found; Market Access and Public Debt Dynamics

Author

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  • Carlo Cottarelli
  • Andrea Presbitero
  • Antonio Bassanetti

Abstract

The empirical literature on sovereign debt crises identifies the level of public debt (measured as a share of GDP) as a key variable to predict debt defaults and to determine sovereign market access. This evidence has led to the widespread use of (country-specific) debt thresholds to assess debt sustainability. We argue that the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, whose use is justified on a theoretical and empirical ground, should not be the only fiscal metric to assess the complex relationship between public debt and debt defaults/market access. In particular, we show that, in a large panel of emerging markets, the dynamics of the debt ratio plays a critical role for market access. In particular, given a certain level of debt, a steadily declining debt ratio is associated with a lower probability of debt distress/market loss and with a higher likelihood of market re-access once access had been lost.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Cottarelli & Andrea Presbitero & Antonio Bassanetti, 2016. "Lost and Found; Market Access and Public Debt Dynamics," IMF Working Papers 16/253, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:16/253
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Corsetti, G. & Erce, A. & Uy, T., 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1730, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Carmine Gabriele & Aitor Erce & Marialena Athanasopoulou & Juan Rojas, 2017. "Debt Stocks Meet Gross Financing Needs: A Flow Perspective into Sustainability," Working Papers 24, European Stability Mechanism.
    3. Rudolf Alvise Lennkh & Edmund Moshammer & Vilém Valenta, 2017. "A Comprehensive Scorecard for Assessing Sovereign Vulnerabilities," Working Papers 23, European Stability Mechanism.
    4. Cui, Wei, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of delayed capital liquidation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86156, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International capital markets; Public debt; Sovereign debt; Default; Econometric models; Emerging markets; Debt sustainability; Access to capital markets; Market access; International financial markets; Fiscal Crises; International Lending and Debt Problems; Deficit;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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