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Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy

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  • Itai Agur
  • Sunil Sharma

Abstract

The paper examines the implementation of macro-prudential policy. Given the coordination, flow of information, analysis, and communication required, macro-prudential frameworks will have weaknesses that make it hard to implement policy. And dealing with the political economy is also likely to be challenging. But limiting discretion through the formulation of macro-prudential rules is complicated by the difficulties in detecting and measuring systemic risk. The paper suggests that oversight is best served by having a strong baseline regulatory regime on which a time-varying macro-prudential policy can be added as conditions warrant and permit.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Agur & Sunil Sharma, 2013. "Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy," IMF Working Papers 13/65, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/65
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Agur, Itai & Demertzis, Maria, 2013. "“Leaning against the wind” and the timing of monetary policy," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 179-194.
    2. Rita Basto, 2013. "A Macro-prudential Policy for Financial Stability," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    3. Velauthapillai, Jeyakrishna, 2015. "Makroprudenzielle Regulierung – eine kurze Einführung und ein Überblick," EconStor Preprints 116781, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    4. Agur, Itai, 2014. "Bank risk within and across equilibria," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 322-333.
    5. Itai Agur & Maria Demertzis, 2015. "Will Macroprudential Policy Counteract Monetary Policy’s Effects on Financial Stability?," IMF Working Papers 15/283, International Monetary Fund.
    6. János Kálmán, 2016. "Bank resolution as a new MNB function – resolution of MKB BankAdministrative law aspects of the macroprudential regulation and supervision of the financial intermediary system – normativity, organisat," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 15(3), pages 27-50.
    7. Lainà, Patrizio & Nyholm, Juho & Sarlin, Peter, 2015. "Leading indicators of systemic banking crises: Finland in a panel of EU countries," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 18-35.
    8. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    9. Jozsef Mezei & Peter Sarlin, 2014. "Aggregation operators for the measurement of systemic risk," Papers 1412.5452, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2014.
    10. Stijn Claessens & Laura E. Kodres, 2014. "The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis; Some Uncomfortable Questions," IMF Working Papers 14/46, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Knot, K., 2014. "Governance of macroprudential policy," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 18, pages 25-32, April.
    12. Remsperger, Hermann, 2013. "Überforderung statt Langeweile?," SAFE White Paper Series 3, Goethe University Frankfurt, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe.
    13. Carsten Detken & Olaf Weeken & Lucia Alessi & Diana Bonfim & Miguel M. Boucinha & Christian Castro & Sebastian Frontczak & Gaston Giordana & Julia Giese & Nadya Jahn & Jan Kakes & Benjamin Klaus & Jan, 2014. "Operationalising the countercyclical capital buffer: indicator selection, threshold identification and calibration options," ESRB Occasional Paper Series 05, European Systemic Risk Board.

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