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Wholesale Bank Funding, Capital Requirements and Credit Rationing

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  • Itai Agur

Abstract

This paper analyzes how different types of bank funding affect the extent to which banks ration credit to borrowers, and the impact that capital requirements have on that rationing. Using an extension of the standard Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, unsecured wholesale finance is shown to amplify the credit market impact of capital requirements as compared to funding by retail depositors. Unsecured finance surged in the pre-crisis years, but is increasingly replaced by secured funding. The collateralization of wholesale funding is found to expand the extent of credit rationing.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Agur, 2013. "Wholesale Bank Funding, Capital Requirements and Credit Rationing," IMF Working Papers 13/30, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/30
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    3. Ignacio Lozano & Alexander Guarín, 2014. "Fragilidad Bancaria en Colombia: Un Análisis Basado en las Hojas de Balance," Borradores de Economia 813, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    4. Alexander Guarín-López & Ignacio Lozano-Espitia, 2016. "Credit Funding and Banking Fragility: An Empirical Analysis for Emerging Economies," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 014306, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    5. Peia, Oana & Vranceanu , Radu, 2014. "Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing," ESSEC Working Papers WP1403, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    6. Ignacio Lozano & Alexander Guarín, 2014. "Banking fragility in Colombia: An empirical analysis based on balance sheets," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE, vol. 32(75), pages 48-63, December.
    7. Francesco Bripi & David Loschiavo & Davide Revelli, 2017. "Services trade and credit frictions: evidence from matched bank-firm data," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1110, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Peia, Oana & Vranceanu, Radu, 2015. "Bank funding constraints and the cost of capital of small firms," ESSEC Working Papers WP1501, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    9. Riccetti, Luca & Russo, Alberto & Mauro, Gallegati, 2013. "Financial Regulation in an Agent Based Macroeconomic Model," MPRA Paper 51013, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; Credit restraint; Capital requirements; Bank credit; Capital; Banks; Rationing; wholesale finance; unsecured; collateral; bank funding; deposit insurance; bank risk; collateralization; Government Policy and Regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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