IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management

  • Lev Ratnovski

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40258
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 13/16.

as
in new window

Length: 41
Date of creation: 18 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/16
Contact details of provider: Postal:
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA

Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Lins, Karl V. & Millers, Darius P. & Stulz, Rene M., 2005. "Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision," Working Paper Series 2005-2, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  2. Mailath George J. & Mester Loretta J., 1994. "A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 272-299, June.
  3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  4. Allen N. Berger & Seth D. Bonime & Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock, 1999. "Why are bank profits so persistent: the roles of product market competition, informational opacity, and regional/macroeconomic shocks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1999-28, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Mark J. Flannery, 1996. "Financial crises, payment system problems, and discount window lending," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 804-831.
  6. Ratnovski, Lev, 2009. "Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 541-558, October.
  7. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Liquidity, Bank Runs, and Bailouts: Spillover Effects During the Northern Rock Episode," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 83-98, June.
  8. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," NBER Working Papers 8711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Evan Gatev & Philip E. Strahan, 2006. "Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 867-892, 04.
  10. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort : Was Bagehot Right After All?," IDEI Working Papers 294, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  11. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
  12. Bruce Ian Carlin & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Obfuscation, Learning, and the Evolution of Investor Sophistication," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(3), pages 754-785.
  13. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," CRSP working papers 476, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  14. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
  15. Carlin, Bruce I., 2009. "Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 278-287, March.
  16. Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean, 2009. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts," IDEI Working Papers 571, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Oct 2010.
  17. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan, 1997. "Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1592, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," CRSP working papers 339, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  19. Wagner, Wolf, 2007. "Financial development and the opacity of banks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 6-10, October.
  20. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-61, July.
  21. Huang, Rocco & Ratnovski, Lev, 2010. "The dark side of bank wholesale funding," Working Paper Series 1223, European Central Bank.
  22. Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Does Function Follow Organzizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1976, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  23. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
  24. Holmstrom, B & Tirole, J, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Working papers 96-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  25. Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh & Andrew Winton, 2007. "Booms, Busts, and Fraud," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(4), pages 1219-1254.
  26. Martin Gonzalez Eiras, 2003. "Bank's Liquidity Demand in the Presence of a Lender of Last Resort," Working Papers 61, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Sep 2003.
  27. Holmström, Bengt, 2011. "Inside and Outside Liquidity," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015783.
  28. Anderson, Ronald C. & Duru, Augustine & Reeb, David M., 2009. "Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 205-222, May.
  29. Paul L. Freedman & Reid W. Click, 2006. "Banks That Don't Lend? Unlocking Credit to Spur Growth in Developing Countries," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 24(3), pages 279-302, 05.
  30. Jeremy C. Stein, 1998. "An Adverse-Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 466-486, Autumn.
  31. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  32. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 2000. "Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 479-519.
  33. Arnoud W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 1998. "The Many Faces of Information Disclosure," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 80, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  34. Hyun Song Shin, 2009. "Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 101-19, Winter.
  35. Philip E. Strahan & Evan Gatev & Til Schuermann, 2004. "How do Banks Manage Liquidity Risk? Evidence from Equity and Deposit Markets in the Fall of 1998," NBER Working Papers 10982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
  37. Paul Bennett & Stavros Peristiani, 2002. "Are U.S. reserve requirements still binding?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue May, pages 53-68.
  38. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
  39. Ostberg, Per, 2006. "Disclosure, investment and regulation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 285-306, July.
  40. Acharya, Viral V & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2004. "Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 4778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  41. Atanasov, Vladimir & Black, Bernard & Ciccotello, Conrad & Gyoshev, Stanley, 2010. "How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 155-173, April.
  42. Stanhouse, Bryan, 1986. " Commercial Bank Portfolio Behavior and Endogenous Uncertainty," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(5), pages 1103-14, December.
  43. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet & Bruno M. Parigi, 2004. "The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First Century Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1085-1115, December.
  44. Berger, Allen N. & Hanweck, Gerald A. & Humphrey, David B., 1987. "Competitive viability in banking : Scale, scope, and product mix economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 501-520, December.
  45. Perotti, Enrico C. & Von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "Strategic Transparency and Informed Trading: Will Capital Market Integration Force Convergence of Corporate Governance?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 61-86, March.
  46. Chen, Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2006. "The transparency of the banking system and the efficiency of information-based bank runs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 307-331, July.
  47. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow)

or (Hassan Zaidi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.