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Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010; Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts

  • Christoph Trebesch
  • Michael G Papaioannou
  • Udaibir S. Das

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 12/203.

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Length: 128
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:12/203
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