Bank Capitalization As a Signal
The level of a bankâ€˜s capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banksâ€˜ creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies.
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- Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
- International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth," IMF Working Papers 08/188, International Monetary Fund.
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