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Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation

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  • Fabian Valencia
  • Kenichi Ueda

Abstract

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Valencia & Kenichi Ueda, 2012. "Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation," IMF Working Papers 12/101, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:12/101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 259-289, December.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Paolo Angelini & Sergio Nicoletti-Altimari & Ignazio Visco, 2012. "Macroprudential, microprudential and monetary policies: conflicts, complementarities and trade-offs," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 140, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    4. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:855-864 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Jakob Palek & Benjamin Schwanebeck, 2015. "Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policy in a Currency Union," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201522, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    6. Bennani, T. & Després, M. & Dujardin, M. & Duprey, T. & Kelber, A., 2014. "Macroprudential framework:key questions applied to the French case," Occasional papers 9, Banque de France.
    7. Arnone, Marco & Romelli, Davide, 2013. "Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 385-398.
    8. Papadamou, Stephanos & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2017. "Does central bank independence affect stock market volatility?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, pages 855-864.
    9. Kim, Soyoung & Mehrotra, Aaron, 2017. "Effects of monetary and macro-prudential policies – evidence from inflation targeting economies in the Asia-Pacific region and potential implications for China," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2017, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    10. Soyoung Kim & Aaron Mehrotra, 2015. "Managing price and financial stability objectives - what can we learn from the Asia-Pacific region?," BIS Working Papers 533, Bank for International Settlements.
    11. repec:ksa:szemle:1701 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Cao, Jin & Chollete, Lorán, 2017. "Monetary policy and financial stability in the long run: A simple game-theoretic approach," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 125-142.
    13. Chortareas, Georgios & Logothetis, Vassileios & Magkonis, Georgios & Zekente, Kalliopi-Maria, 2016. "The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 11-13.
    14. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.
    15. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    16. Gerba, Eddie & Macchiarelli, Corrado, 2016. "Interaction between monetary policy and bank regulation: theory and European practice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68344, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Paolo Angelini & Sergio Nicoletti-Altimari & Ignazio Visco, 2013. "Macroprudential, Microprudential and Monetary Policies: Policies, Complementarities and Trade-Offs," Chapters,in: Stability of the Financial System, chapter 22 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banks; Central bank independence; Central bank autonomy; Economic models; Monetary policy; Macro-prudential Regulation; Time-inconsistency; inflation; central bank; financial stability; independent central bank;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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