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The Economic Crisis; Did Financial Supervision Matter?

  • Marc Quintyn
  • Rosaria Vega Pansini
  • Donato Masciandaro

The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of two of these efforts - modifications in the architecture of financial supervision and in supervisory governance - and concludes that they were negatively correlated with economic resilience. Using the emerging distinction between macro- and micro-prudential supervision, we explore to what extent two separate institutions would allow for more checks and balances to improve supervisory governance and, thus, reduce the probability of supervisory failure.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 11/261.

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Length: 47
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/261
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  1. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
  2. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Marion Kohler & Christian Upper, 2009. "Financial Crises and Economic Activity," NBER Working Papers 15379, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Domenico Giannone & Michele Lenza & Lucrezia Reichlin, 2011. "Market Freedom and the Global Recession," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 59(1), pages 111-135, April.
  4. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2011. "Cross-country causes and consequences of the crisis: an update," Working Paper Series 2011-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  5. Boyer, Pierre C. & Ponce, Jorge, 2012. "Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 206-217.
  6. Reinhart, Carmen & Felton, Andrew, 2008. "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century," MPRA Paper 11862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Caprio, Gerard Jr. & D'Apice, Vincenzo & Ferri, Giovanni & Puopolo, Giovanni Walter, 2010. "Macro Financial Determinants of the Great Financial Crisis: Implications for Financial Regulation," MPRA Paper 26088, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Romain Rancière & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2002. "Systemic crises and growth," Economics Working Papers 854, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2004.
  9. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management; The Role of Regulatory Governance," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2003. "Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 9620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Marc Quintyn, 2007. "Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - A Stocktaking Exercise," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  12. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven & Deniz Igan & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2010. "Lessons and Policy Implications From the Global Financial Crisis," IMF Working Papers 10/44, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Richard Podpiera, 2004. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Working Papers 04/204, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Jorge Ponce, 2010. "A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(2), pages 141-181, July-Dece.
  16. Alessandro Gambini & Salim M. Darbar & Marco Arnone, 2007. "Banking Supervision; Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 07/82, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, 2010. "Regulatory Reform: Integrating Paradigms," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 109-139, 03.
  18. Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza & Jean-Louis Arcand, 2012. "Too Much Finance?," IMF Working Papers 12/161, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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