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Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks; An Assessment of Stylized Institutional Models

Author

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  • Erlend Nier
  • Luis Ignacio Jácome
  • Jacek Osinski
  • Pamela Madrid

Abstract

A number of countries are reviewing their institutional arrangements for financial stability to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Against this background, this paper provides basic guidance for the design of effective arrangements, in a manner that can provide a framework for country-specific advice. After reviewing briefly the main institutional elements of existing and emerging macroprudential policy frameworks across countries, the paper identifies stylized institutional models based on key features that distinguish institutional arrangements. It develops criteria to assess the effectiveness of models, examines the strengths and weaknesses of models against these criteria, and explores ways to improve existing setups. The paper finally distills lessons and sets out desired principles for effective macroprudential policy arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Erlend Nier & Luis Ignacio Jácome & Jacek Osinski & Pamela Madrid, 2011. "Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks; An Assessment of Stylized Institutional Models," IMF Working Papers 11/250, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/250
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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
    2. Malgorzata Olszak, 2012. "Macroprudential policy - aim, instruments and institutional architecture (Polityka ostroznosciowa w ujêciu makro - cel, instrumenty i architektura instytucjonalna)," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 10(39), pages 7-32.
    3. Edgardo Demaestri & Gustavo Ferro, 2013. "Analysis of the Integration of Financial Regulation and Supervision to the Central Bank," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(68), pages 75-106, June.
    4. Pablo Federico & Carlos A. Vegh & Guillermo Vuletin, 2014. "Reserve Requirement Policy over the Business Cycle," NBER Working Papers 20612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jacome H., Luis I. & Saadi Sedik, Tahsin & Townsend, Simon, 2012. "Can emerging market central banks bail out banks? A cautionary tale from Latin America," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 424-448.
    6. Itai Agur & Sunil Sharma, 2013. "Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy," IMF Working Papers 13/65, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Beirne, John & Friedrich, Christian, 2017. "Macroprudential policies, capital flows, and the structure of the banking sector," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 47-68.
    8. Junichi Fujimoto & Ko Munakata & Koji Nakamura & Yuki Teranishi, 2017. "Optimal Policy Analysis in a New Keynesian Economy with Credit Market Search," GRIPS Discussion Papers 16-30, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    9. Stefan Gerlach, 2013. "Monetary Policy after the Crisis," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 81, pages 16-34, September.
    10. Ananthakrishnan Prasad & Heba Abdel Monem & Pilar Garcia Martinez, 2016. "Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability in the Arab Region," IMF Working Papers 16/98, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Yves Mersch, 2013. "Default of Systemically Important Financial Intermediaries: Short-Term Stability vs. Incentive Compatability," Chapters,in: Stability of the Financial System, chapter 11 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    13. L. Dalla Pellegrina & D. Masciandaro & R. Pansini, 2014. "Do exchange rate regimes affect the role of central banks as banking supervisors?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 279-315, October.
    14. Mike Mariathasan & Ouarda Merrouche, 2012. "Recapitalization, credit and liquidity," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 27(72), pages 603-646, October.

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