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Consolidated Regulation and Supervision in the United States


  • Ashok Vir Bhatia


This paper builds on a Technical Note produced as part of the IMF’s 2010 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) review of the United States. It addresses enterprise-wide oversight of financial groups, a key tool to mitigate systemic risk. Focusing on legal arrangements, it recommends eliminating exceptions for holding companies owning certain limited-purpose banks, harmonizing arrangements for bank and thrift holding companies, and bringing into the net a few systemic nonbank financial groups, with the Federal Reserve as the sole consolidated regulator and supervisor.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashok Vir Bhatia, 2011. "Consolidated Regulation and Supervision in the United States," IMF Working Papers 11/23, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/23

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Batchelor, Roy & Dua, Pami, 1991. "Blue Chip Rationality Tests," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(4), pages 692-705, November.
    2. Davies, Anthony & Lahiri, Kajal, 1995. "A new framework for analyzing survey forecasts using three-dimensional panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 205-227, July.
    3. Carl S Bonham & Richard H Cohen, 2000. "Testing the Rational Expectations Hypothesis using Survey Data," Working Papers 200007, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edgardo Demaestri & Gustavo Ferro, 2013. "Analysis of the Integration of Financial Regulation and Supervision to the Central Bank," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(68), pages 75-106, June.
    2. repec:fip:fedcwp:13-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Edgardo Demaestri & Gustavo Ferro, 2015. "The Debate on Integrated Financial Supervision: What is New?," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(72), pages 27-58, June.
    4. Mark D. Flood & Jonathan Katz & Stephen J. Ong & Adam Smith, 2013. "Cryptography and the economics of supervisory information: balancing transparency and confidentiality," Working Paper 1312, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.


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