IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics

  • Man-Keung Tang
  • Xiangrong Yu

This paper studies the role of central bank communication of its economic assessment in shaping inflation dynamics. Imperfect information about the central bank''s assessment - or the basis for monetary policy decisions - could complicate the private sector''s learning about its policy response function. We show how clear central bank communication, which facilitates agents'' understanding of policy reasoning, could bring about less volatile inflation and interest rate dynamics, and afford the authorities with greater policy flexibility. We then estimate a simple monetary model to fit the Mexican economy, and use the suggested paramters to illustrate the model''s quantitative implications in scenarios where the timing, nature and persistence of shocks are uncertain.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25199
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 11/209.

as
in new window

Length: 32
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/209
Contact details of provider: Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htmEmail:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2007. "Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization," Discussion Papers 0708-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  2. Pierpaolo Benigno & David López-Salido, 2002. "Inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy in the euro area," International Finance Discussion Papers 749, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. International Monetary Fund, 2009. "Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Policy Credibility," IMF Working Papers 09/94, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  5. Ricardo Nunes, 2005. "Learning the inflation target," Macroeconomics 0504033, EconWPA, revised 26 Apr 2005.
  6. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-45, December.
  7. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
  8. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
  9. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Kosuke Aoki & Takeshi Kimura, 2008. "Central bank's two-way communication with the public and inflation dynamics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25483, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. M. H. Khalil Timamy, 2005. "Debate," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(104-105), pages 383-393, June.
  12. Carlos Capistrán & Allan Timmermann, 2008. "Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations," CREATES Research Papers 2008-56, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  13. Andrew G. Haldane & Nicoletta Batini, 1998. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Makoto Minegishi & Boris Cournède, 2009. "The Role of Transparency in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 724, OECD Publishing.
  15. George W. Evans & William A.Branch, 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2010-4, University of Oregon Economics Department.
  16. Collard, Fabrice & Dellas, Harris, 2004. "The New Keynesian Model with Imperfect Information and Learning," IDEI Working Papers 273, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  17. William A. Brock & Cars H. Hommes, 1997. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1059-1096, September.
  18. Rozkrut, Marek & Rybinski, Krzysztof & Sztaba, Lucyna & Szwaja, Radoslaw, 2007. "Quest for central bank communication: Does it pay to be "talkative"?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 176-206, March.
  19. Chanont Banternghansa & Michael W. McCracken, 2009. "Forecast disagreement among FOMC members," Working Papers 2009-059, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  20. Carvalho, Alexandre & Moura, Marcelo L., 2008. "What Can Taylor Rules Say About Monetary Policy in Latin America?," Insper Working Papers wpe_126, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  21. Fabio Milani, 2005. "Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Persistence," Macroeconomics 0510022, EconWPA.
  22. Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation forecasts and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 653-686.
  23. Woodford, Michael, 2000. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Seminar Papers 666, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  24. M. Hashem Pesaran & Martin Weale, 2005. "Survey Expectations," CESifo Working Paper Series 1599, CESifo Group Munich.
  25. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Robust monetary policy rules with unknown natural rates," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  26. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis & Justin Wolfers, 2003. "Disagreement about Inflation Expectations," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2011, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  27. John C Williams & Athanasios Orphanides, 2005. "Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 400, Society for Computational Economics.
  28. Gagnon, Edith & Khan, Hashmat, 2005. "New Phillips curve under alternative production technologies for Canada, the United States, and the Euro area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1571-1602, August.
  29. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2009. "Explaining Monetary Policy in Press Conferences," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(2), pages 42-84, June.
  30. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central-bank communication and policy effectiveness," Discussion Papers 0506-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  31. Sims, Christopher A, 2002. "Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 20(1-2), pages 1-20, October.
  32. Scott Roger & Mark R. Stone, 2005. "On Target? the International Experience with Achieving Inflation Targets," IMF Working Papers 05/163, International Monetary Fund.
  33. Fabián Gredig U. & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel D. & Rodrigo O. Valdés P., 2008. "The Monetary Policy Horizon in Chile and Other Inflation-Targeting Countries," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 11(1), pages 5-27, April.
  34. Yang K. Lu & Ernesto Pasten & Robert G. King, 2008. "Managing expectations," 2008 Meeting Papers 959, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  35. Michele Berardi, 2006. "Monetary policy with heterogeneous and misspecified expectations," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 81, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  36. Brock, William A. & Hommes, Cars H., 1998. "Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple asset pricing model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1235-1274, August.
  37. Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N. & West, Kenneth D., 2007. "Model uncertainty and policy evaluation: Some theory and empirics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 629-664, February.
  38. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  39. Luca Benati, 2008. "Investigating Inflation Persistence Across Monetary Regimes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(3), pages 1005-1060, August.
  40. Carlos Capistrán & Manuel Ramos Francia, 2007. "Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?," Working Papers 2007-11, Banco de México.
  41. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  42. Daniel Chiquiar & Antonio Noriega & Manuel Ramos-Francia, 2010. "A time-series approach to test a change in inflation persistence: the Mexican experience," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(24), pages 3067-3075.
  43. Andersson, Malin & Dillen, Hans & Sellin, Peter, 2006. "Monetary policy signaling and movements in the term structure of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1815-1855, November.
  44. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2006. "Revealing the secrets of the temple: the value of publishing central bank interest rate projections," Working Paper Series 2006-31, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  45. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  46. Gaspar, Vítor & Smets, Frank & Vestin, David, 2006. "Adaptive learning, persistence, and optimal monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0644, European Central Bank.
  47. Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
  48. Bank for International Settlements, 2009. "Communication of monetary policy decisions by central banks: what is revealed and why," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 47, April.
  49. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  50. Luis F. Céspedes & Marcelo Ochoa & Claudio Soto, 2005. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve in an Emerging Market Economy: The Case of Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 355, Central Bank of Chile.
  51. Branch, William A. & McGough, Bruce, 2009. "A New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1036-1051, May.
  52. Simon Hall & Chris Salmon & Tony Yates & Nicoletta Batini, 1999. "Uncertainty and Simple Monetary Policy Rules - An illustration for the United Kingdom," Bank of England working papers 96, Bank of England.
  53. Andersson, Magnus & Hofmann, Boris, 2009. "Gauging the effectiveness of quantitative forward guidance: evidence from three inflation targeters," Working Paper Series 1098, European Central Bank.
  54. Roberts, John M, 1995. "New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 975-84, November.
  55. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
  56. Fujiwara, Ippei, 2005. "Is the central bank's publication of economic forecasts influential?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 255-261, December.
  57. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," NBER Working Papers 10829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/209. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow)

or (Hassan Zaidi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.