Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
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More about this item
KeywordsCentral bank autonomy; Budget deficits; Budgetary policy; Fiscal policy; Inflation; Political economy; Fiscal councils; deficit bias; delegation; central bank; fiscal institutions; fiscal agencies; Structure; Scope; and Performance of Government; National Deficit Surplus;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-08-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CDM-2011-08-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-08-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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