Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers
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KeywordsCentral banks and their policies; Economic models; Monetary policy; Monetary authorities; Governance; Russian Federation; Monetary Policy Committee; Commitment; Discretion; Optimal Monetary Policy; inflation; monetary authority; monetary economics;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2010-03-28 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2010-03-28 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2010-03-28 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2010-03-28 (Monetary Economics)
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