Should Advanced Countries Adopt a Fiscal Responsibility Law?
Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) appear to be more popular in middle-income countries than advanced countries, even though their success is limited. The reasons why few advanced countries have a FRL include: the existing legal framework for the budget system is adequate; supranational rules and political agreements in EU countries; failed attempts to include quantitative fiscal rules in laws; lack of consensus or interest in attaining the goals of FRL-type legislation; and lack of need for a law to regulate fiscal transparency, accountability and macro-fiscal stabilization. Without commitment to fiscal discipline, adoption of a FRL may not contribute to attaining fiscal consolidation goals.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA|
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Rae, 2002. "Next Steps for Public Spending in New Zealand: The Pursuit of Effectiveness," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 337, OECD Publishing.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram Wolff, 2006.
"Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia,"
DNB Working Papers
103, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Fool The Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency And Sovereign Risk Premia," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(4), pages 465-487, 09.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2006. "Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia," CESifo Working Paper Series 1732, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bernoth, Kerstin & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,19, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Vincent Koen & Paul van den Noord, 2005. "Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-Off Measures and Creative Accounting," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 417, OECD Publishing.
- Stéphanie Guichard & Mike Kennedy & Eckhard Wurzel & Christophe André, 2007. "What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 553, OECD Publishing.
- Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco & Stefania Zotteri, 2007. "The Reliability of EMU FIscal Indicators: Risks and Safeguards," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 633, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow)or (Hassan Zaidi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.