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The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System

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  • Manmohan Singh
  • James Aitken

Abstract

This paper examines the sizable role of rehypothecation in the shadow banking system. Rehypothecation is the practice that allows collateral posted by, say, a hedge fund to its prime broker to be used again as collateral by that prime broker for its own funding. In the United Kingdom, such use of a customer’s assets by a prime broker can be for an unlimited amount of the customer’s assets while in the United States rehypothecation is capped. Incorporating estimates for rehypothecation (and the associated re-use of collateral) in the recent crisis indicates that the collapse in non-bank funding to banks was sizable. We show that the shadow banking system was at least 50 percent bigger than documented so far. We also provide estimates from the hedge fund industry for the - churning - factor or re-use of collateral. From a policy angle, supervisors of large banks that report on a global consolidated basis may need to enhance their understanding of the off-balance sheet funding that these banks receive via rehypothecation from other jurisdictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, 2010. "The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System," IMF Working Papers 10/172, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/172
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary B. Gorton, 2010. "Questions and Answers about the Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Tobias Adrian & Michael J. Fleming, 2005. "What financing data reveal about dealer leverage," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 11(Mar).
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    Cited by:

    1. Andolfatto, David & Martin, Fernando M. & Zhang, Shengxing, 2017. "Rehypothecation and liquidity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 488-505.
    2. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    3. Hansjörg HERR, 2016. "After the Financial Crisis: Reforms and Reform Options for Finance, Regulation and Institutional Structure," Journal of Economics Bibliography, KSP Journals, vol. 3(2), pages 172-202, June.
    4. Tamim Bayoumi & Ashok Vir Bhatia, 2012. "Leverage? What Leverage? A Deep Dive into the U.S. Flow of Funds in Search of Clues to the Global Crisis," IMF Working Papers 12/162, International Monetary Fund.
    5. William R. White, 2014. "The Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions: Why Regulatory Responses to the Crisis Might Not Prove Sufficient," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1108, OECD Publishing.
    6. Sidanius, Che & Zikes, Filip, 2012. "Financial Stability Paper No 18: OTC derivatives reform and collateral demand impact," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 18, Bank of England.
    7. Donaldson, Jason & Micheler, Eva, 2016. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66042, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Orestes Collazo Brañanova, 2013. "Shadow banking in Spain," IFC Bulletins chapters,in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Proceedings of the Sixth IFC Conference on "Statistical issues and activities in a changing environment", Basel, 28-29 August 2012., volume 36, pages 89-98 Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Kempf, Elisabeth & Manconi, Alberto & Massa, Massimo, 2017. "Canary in a Coalmine: Securities Lending Predicting the Performance of Securitized Bonds," CEPR Discussion Papers 11993, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Jaafar, Aziz & Omar, Fatma A. & Salleh, Murizah Osman, 2016. "Can Islamic injunctions indemnify the structural flaws of securitized debt?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 271-286.
    11. Michael Grill & Karl Schmedders & Felix Kubler & Johannes Brumm, 2017. "Re-use of Collateral: Leverage, Volatility, and Welfare," 2017 Meeting Papers 697, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Lucas Marc Fuhrer & Basil Guggenheim & Silvio Schumacher, 2016. "Re‐Use of Collateral in the Repo Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(6), pages 1169-1193, September.
    13. Gianfranco Battisti, 2014. "SHADOW BANKING - A Geographical Interpretation," ERSA conference papers ersa14p642, European Regional Science Association.
    14. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Sizing Up Repo," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2381-2417, December.
    15. Ghosh, Swati & Gonzalez del Mazo, Ines & İnci Ötker-Robe, 2012. "Chasing the Shadows: How Significant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets?," World Bank - Economic Premise, The World Bank, issue 88, pages 1-7, September.
    16. Swati Ghosh & Ines Gonzalez del Mazo & ?nci Ötker-Robe, 2012. "Chasing the Shadows : How Significant is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets?," World Bank Other Operational Studies 17088, The World Bank.
    17. Dive, Matthew & Hodge, Ronan & Jones, Catrin & Purchase, James, 2011. "Developments in the global securities lending market," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 51(3), pages 224-233.
    18. Mark J. Flannery & Paul Glasserman & David K.A. Mordecai & Cliff Rossi, 2012. "Forging Best Practices in Risk Management," Working Papers 12-02, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    19. Sakurai, Yuji & Uchida, Yoshihiko, 2014. "Rehypothecation dilemma: Impact of collateral rehypothecation on derivative prices under bilateral counterparty credit risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 361-373.

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