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Institutional Inertia

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  • Laura Valderrama

Abstract

We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Valderrama, 2009. "Institutional Inertia," IMF Working Papers 09/193, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/193
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    Keywords

    Economic models; Corporate sector; Corporate governance; Political economy; Productivity; Voting power; Technology transfer; Private Information; Property Rights; Dynamic Voting; Inertia; voting; technology choice; technologies; voter; technological change;

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