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The Quality of Public Investment

  • Shankha Chakraborty
  • Era Dabla-Norris

This paper develops a growth model with specialized goods where inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies interact with the provision of public investment services in affecting the productivity of private capital, specialization, and growth. The model provides potential explanations for the contradictory empirical results on the effects of public investment found in the literature as well as for the role of the quality of public infrastructure investment in creating a gap between rich and poor countries. From a policy perspective, the paper suggests that the link between public investment and growth depends critically on the quality and efficiency of public capital.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 09/154.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/154
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  1. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Productive government expenditures and long-run growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 183-204, January.
  2. Charles R. Hulten & Esra Bennathan & Sylaja Srinivasan, 2006. "Infrastructure, Externalities, and Economic Development: A Study of the Indian Manufacturing Industry," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 20(2), pages 291-308.
  3. Charles R. Hulten, 1996. "Infrastructure Capital and Economic Growth: How Well You Use It May Be More Important Than How Much You Have," NBER Working Papers 5847, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(1), pages 1.
  5. Straub, Stephane, 2008. "Infrastructure and development : a critical appraisal of the macro level literature," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4590, The World Bank.
  6. Keith Blackburn & Niloy Bose & M. Emranul Haque, 2004. " Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0407, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  7. Esfahani, Hadi Salehi & Ramirez, Maria Teresa, 2003. "Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 443-477, April.
  8. Devarajan, Shantayanan & Swaroop, Vinaya & Heng-fu, Zou, 1996. "The composition of public expenditure and economic growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 313-344, April.
  9. Barro, R.J., 1988. "Government Spending In A Simple Model Of Endogenous Growth," RCER Working Papers 130, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Dal Bo, Ernesto & Rossi, Martin A., 2007. "Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 939-962, June.
  11. Duggal, Vijaya G. & Saltzman, Cynthia & Klein, Lawrence R., 2007. "Infrastructure and productivity: An extension to private infrastructure and it productivity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 485-502, October.
  12. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Coping with poor public capital," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 51-69, October.
  13. Pritchett, Lant, 2000. "The tyranny of concepts - CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated Investment Effort) is NOT capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2341, The World Bank.
  14. Romp, Ward & de Haan, Jakob, 2005. "Public capital and economic growth: a critical survey," EIB Papers 2/2005, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
  15. Daron Acemoglu & Jaume Ventura, 2002. "The World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 659-694, May.
  16. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 1994. "Public investment in infrastructure in a simple growth model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 1173-1187, November.
  17. Fisher, Walter H & Turnovsky, Stephen J, 1998. "Public Investment, Congestion, and Private Capital Accumulation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 399-413, March.
  18. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
  19. Aschauer, David Alan, 1989. "Is public expenditure productive?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-200, March.
  20. Andvig, Jens Chr. & Moene, Karl Ove, 1990. "How corruption may corrupt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 63-76, January.
  21. Romer, Paul M, 1987. "Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to Specialization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 56-62, May.
  22. K Blackburn & R Sarmah, 2005. "Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 55, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  23. Stephane Straub, 2008. "Infrastructure and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Advances and Research Challenges," ESE Discussion Papers 179, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  24. Era Dabla-Norris & Scott Freeman, 2004. "Enforcement of Property Rights and Underdevelopment," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 391-405, 08.
  25. Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte, 1998. "Rent seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model," Working Paper 98-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  26. José Pineda & Francisco Rodríguez, 2006. "Public Investment in Infrastructure and Productivity Growth: Evidence from the Venezuelan Manufacturing Sector," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2006-010, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  27. K Blackburn & G Forgues-Puccio, 2005. "Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 54, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
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