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Will they Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the new European System of Financial Supervisors

  • Marc G Quintyn
  • Donato Masciandaro
  • María Nieto

In June 2009 a new financial supervisory framework for the European Union (EU) was endorsed, consisting of a macro- and a micro-prudential pillar. The latter is composed of a Steering Committee, a supranational layer and a network of national supervisory authorities at the bottom, de facto establishing a complex multiple principals-multiple agents network. This paper focuses on the network of national agencies. Starting from an analysis of supervisory architectures and governance arrangements, we assess to what extent lack of convergence could undermine efficient and effective supervision. The main conclusion is that harmonization of governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors' incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the quality of supervision.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 09/142.

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Length: 43
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/142
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  1. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
  2. Alessandro Gambini & Salim M. Darbar & Marco Arnone, 2007. "Banking Supervision; Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 07/82, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Michael W Taylor & Marc G Quintyn & Silvia Ramirez, 2007. "The Fear of Freedom; Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 07/25, International Monetary Fund.
  4. David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry Wall, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Working Papers 0819, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
  5. Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 2003. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 49(2), pages 259-294.
  6. Lastra, Rosa Maria, 2006. "Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269341, December.
  7. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc, 2008. "Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 153-173, August.
  8. Donato Masciandaro & Maria Nieto & Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Financial supervision in the EU: is there convergence in the national architectures?," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 86-95, May.
  9. Jeffrey Carmichael & Alexander Fleming & David Llewellyn, 2004. "Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 14876, October.
  10. Marc Quintyn, 2007. "Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - A Stocktaking Exercise," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  11. Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Donato Masciandaro, 2006. "E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-102, January.
  13. International Monetary Fund, 2009. "A European Mandate for Financial Sector Supervisors in the EU," IMF Working Papers 09/5, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Donato Masciandaro & Maria J. Nieto & Henriette Prast, 2007. "Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and trends," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 15(3), pages 303-326, July.
  15. Michael W Taylor & Marc G Quintyn & Eva H. G. Hüpkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors; Principles and Practice," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
  17. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, 2008. "Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial supervision architectures," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 290-317, November.
  18. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
  19. Donato Masciandaro & Maria Nieto & Henriette Prast, 2007. "Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and practices," DNB Working Papers 141, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  20. Martin Cihak & Wim Fonteyne, 2009. "Five Years After; European Union Membership and Macro-Financial Stability in the New Member States," IMF Working Papers 09/68, International Monetary Fund.
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  22. Alicia Novoa & Steven A. Seelig, 2009. "Governance Practices At Financial Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies," IMF Working Papers 09/135, International Monetary Fund.
  23. Mayes, David & Vesala, Jukka, 1998. "On the problems of the home country control," Research Discussion Papers 20/1998, Bank of Finland.
  24. Udaibir S Das & Marc G Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management; The Role of Regulatory Governance," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund.
  25. Martin Cihak & Alexander F. Tieman, 2008. "Quality of Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision Around the World," IMF Working Papers 08/190, International Monetary Fund.
  26. Prati, A. & Schinasi, G.J., 1999. "Financial Stability in European Economic and Monetary Union," Princeton Studies in International Economics 86, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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