IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/09-129.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Amadou N Sy

Abstract

Credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. Proposals to regulate credit rating agencies focus on micro-prudential issues and aim at reducing conflicts of interest and increasing transparency and competition. In contrast, this paper argues that macro-prudential regulation is necessary to address the systemic risk inherent to ratings. The paper illustrates how financial markets have increasingly relied on ratings. It shows how downgrades have led to systemic market losses and increased illiquidity. The paper suggests the use of "ratings maps" and stress-tests to assess the systemic risk of ratings, and increased capital or liquidity buffers to manage such risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Amadou N Sy, 2009. "The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets," IMF Working Papers 09/129, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/129
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=23030
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Siegfried Utzig, 2010. "The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies : A European Banking Perspective," Finance Working Papers 21990, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    2. Brutti, Filippo & Sauré, Philip, 2015. "Transmission of sovereign risk in the Euro crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 231-248.
    3. Paweł Niedziółka, 2019. "Ryzyko systemowe oraz reputacyjne w działalności agencji ratingowych," Gospodarka Narodowa, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 2, pages 127-148.
    4. Duan, Jin-Chuan & Van Laere, Elisabeth, 2012. "A public good approach to credit ratings – From concept to reality," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3239-3247.
    5. T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao, 2010. "Financial crisis, efficient bailouts, and regulatory policy," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(2), pages 167-188.
    6. Bart Stellinga & Daniel Mügge, 2017. "The regulator's conundrum. How market reflexivity limits fundamental financial reform," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 393-423, May.
    7. Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 338, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    8. Clyde Goodlet, 2010. "Too Big to Fail: A Misguided Policy in Times of Financial Turmoil," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 311, October.
    9. Faruk Ülgen, 2014. "Financialized capitalism and the irrelevance of self-regulation : a Minskyian analysis of systemic viability," Post-Print halshs-01111162, HAL.
    10. Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar & Owolabi, Oluwarotimi & Pal, Sarmistha, 2018. "Private information, institutional distance, and the failure of cross-border acquisitions: Evidence from the banking sector in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 504-513.
    11. Faruk Ülgen, 2015. "From liberal finance inconsistency to relevant systemic regulation : an institutionalist analysis," Post-Print halshs-01166696, HAL.
    12. Themistokles Lazarides & Evaggelos Drimpetas, 2016. "Defining the factors of Fitch rankings in the European banking sector," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 6(2), pages 315-339, August.
    13. Dieter Smeets, 2016. "Financial Contagion During the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 4(2), pages 46-59, April.
    14. Abad, Pilar & Alsakka, Rasha & ap Gwilym, Owain, 2018. "The influence of rating levels and rating convergence on the spillover effects of sovereign credit actions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 40-57.
    15. Alsakka, Rasha & ap Gwilym, Owain, 2013. "Rating agencies’ signals during the European sovereign debt crisis: Market impact and spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 144-162.
    16. Hu, Xiaolu & Huang, Haozhi & Pan, Zheyao & Shi, Jing, 2019. "Information asymmetry and credit rating: A quasi-natural experiment from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 132-152.
    17. Chiwitt, Ulrich, 2014. "Ratingagenturen - Fluch oder Segen? Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme," Arbeitspapiere der FOM 48, FOM Hochschule für Oekonomie & Management.
    18. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:209-228 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Javier Wrana & José María Martín Flores, 2014. "Eurozone sovereign bonds and rating assessments: impact on volatility," Papeles de Europa, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI), vol. 27(1), pages 01-32.
    20. Vassiliki L. Papaikonomou, 2010. "Credit rating agencies and global financial crisis: Need for a paradigm shift in financial market regulation," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 27(2), pages 161-174, June.
    21. Erik R. Fasten & Dirk Hofmann, 2010. "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Hassan Zaidi to update the entry or send us the correct email address. General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.