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Striving to Be “Clearly Open†and “Crystal Clear†; Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB

  • Ales Bulir
  • Katerina Smídková

The Czech National Bank has a respectable track record in terms of its policy actions and the corresponding inflation outturns. Using a simple forward-looking policy rule, we find that its main communication tools-inflation targets, inflation forecasts, verbal assessments of the inflation risks contained in quarterly inflation reports, and the voting within the CNB Board-provided a clear message in about three out of every four observations in our 2001- 2005 sample.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 08/84.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/84
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  1. Jan Filacek & Luboš Komárek & Petr Král, 2007. "Why Central Bankers Should Disclose: Interest Rate Forecast," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 558-576, December.
  2. Lavan Mahadeva & Katerina Smidkova, 2003. "What is the Appropriate Rate of Disinflation to Be Targeted in the Czech Economy?," Macroeconomics 0303015, EconWPA.
  3. Martin Fukac, 2006. "New Keynesian Model Dynamics under Heterogeneous Expectations and Adaptive Learning," Working Papers 2006/5, Czech National Bank, Research Department.
  4. Bernanke, Ben S & Woodford, Michael, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 653-84, November.
  5. Marcel Peter & Scott Roger & Geoffrey Heenan, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting; Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 06/278, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," Other publications TiSEM b34dfb1f-520f-4787-a08f-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  7. Mikael Apel & Anders Vredin, 2007. "Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 499-520, December.
  8. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
  9. Geraats, Petra M., 2001. "Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts," Working Paper Series 0041, European Central Bank.
  10. Viktor Kotlán & David Navrátil, 2003. "Inflation Targeting as a Stabilization Tool: Its Design and Performance in the Czech Republic," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 53(5-6), pages 220-242, May.
  11. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.
  12. Bulir, Ales & Hurnik, Jaromir, 2006. "The Maastricht inflation criterion: How unpleasant is purgatory?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 385-404, December.
  13. Andrew G. Haldane & Nicoletta Batini, 1998. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. repec:prg:jnlpep:v:2001:y:2001:i:2:id:171 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Q. Farooq Akram & Yakov Ben-Haim & Øyvind Eitrheim, 2006. "Managing uncertainty through robust-satisficing monetary policy," Working Paper 2006/10, Norges Bank.
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