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Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth


  • International Monetary Fund


The volume of credit extended by a bank can be an informative signal of its abilities in loan selection and management. It is shown that, under asymmetric information, banks may therefore rationally lend more than they would otherwise in order to demonstrate their quality, thus negatively affecting financial system soundness. Small shifts in technology and uncertainty associated with new technology may lead to large jumps in equilibrium outcomes. Prudential measures and supervision are therefore warranted.

Suggested Citation

  • International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth," IMF Working Papers 08/188, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/188

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Peter Backé & Balázs Égert, 2006. "Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe: New (Over)Shooting Stars?," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1, pages 112-139.
    3. Cottarelli, Carlo & Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Vladkova-Hollar, Ivanna, 2005. "Early birds, late risers, and sleeping beauties: Bank credit growth to the private sector in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 83-104, January.
    4. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 367-384, March.
    5. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Lending Booms and Lending Standards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2511-2546, October.
    6. Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-1365, November.
    7. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    8. Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, 2004. "Banking Competition, Risk and Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 783-804, December.
    9. Kraft, Evan & Jankov, Ljubinko, 2005. "Does speed kill? Lending booms and their consequences in Croatia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 105-121, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel C Hardy, 2012. "Bank Capitalization As a Signal," IMF Working Papers 12/114, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item


    Bank credit; Credit demand; Economic models; Risk management; Loans; Household credit; credit screening; loan quality; signaling games; incentive compatibility; probability; banking; equation; banking system; banks ? loan;

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