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Implementing Inflation Targeting; Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications

  • Marcel Peter
  • Scott Roger
  • Geoffrey Heenan

Transparency is a central element in most aspects of the design and operation of inflation targeting regimes. This paper focuses on three elements of inflation targeting most closely associated with transparency: (i) the institutional arrangements supporting inflation targeting; (ii) the specification of the inflation target; and (iii) the central bank's policy communications. The paper is primarily aimed at providing practical advice to countries planning to develop an inflation targeting framework, but many of the issues are relevant for any credible, independent monetary policy.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 06/278.

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Length: 57
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/278
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  1. Scott Roger & Mark R. Stone, 2005. "On Target? the International Experience with Achieving Inflation Targets," IMF Working Papers 05/163, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Turgut Kisinbay & Eric Parrado & Rodolfo Maino & Jorge Iván Canales Kriljenko, 2006. "Setting the Operational Framework for Producing Inflation Forecasts," IMF Working Papers 06/122, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
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  6. Anita Tuladhar, 2005. "Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks," IMF Working Papers 05/183, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474.
  8. Bernard Laurens & Marco Arnone & Jean-François Segalotto, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy; Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Paul Jackman, 2002. "The Reserve Bank's external communications," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 65, March.
  10. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
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  12. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  13. Douglas Laxton & Alasdair Scott & David Rose, 2009. "Developing a Structured Forecasting and Policy Analysis System to Support Inflation-Forecast Targeting (IFT)," IMF Working Papers 09/65, International Monetary Fund.
  14. J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999. "Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
  15. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2006. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Working Papers 12638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  17. JoAnne Morris & Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance; A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 04/226, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Alain Ize, 2005. "Capitalizing Central Banks: A Net Worth Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(2), pages 289-310, September.
  19. Paul Conway, 2000. "Monetary policy in an uncertain world," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 63, September.
  20. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  21. Jérôme Vandenbussche, 2006. "Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design," IMF Working Papers 06/277, International Monetary Fund.
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  23. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
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