A Debt Overhang Model for Low-Income Countries; Implications for Debt Relief
The paper presents a theoretical model to explain how debt overhang is generated in low-income countries and discusses its implications for debt relief. The paper indicates that the extent of debt overhang, and the effectiveness of debt relief, would depend on a recipient country's initial economic conditions and level of total factor productivity.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2006|
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