Economic and Political Determinants of Tax Amnesties in the U.S. States
This paper revisits earlier studies on the determinants of tax amnesties. The novel findings are (i) amnesties are more likely to be declared during fiscal stress periods, and (ii) political factors significantly affect the introduction and timing of amnesties. In particular, the paper empirically disentangles opposite theoretical effects to show that governors perceive amnesties as another revenue source (rather than a tax increase alternative). Finally, supporting evidence shows that by breaking horizontal equity, amnesties might be perceived as unfair: a significant correlation exists between governors who lost their reelection bids and the introduction of a tax amnesty during their election years.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA|
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003.
"Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
- Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996.
9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Malik, Arun S. & Schwab, Robert M., 1991. "The economics of tax amnesties," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 29-49, October.
- Stella, Peter, 1991. "An economic analysis of tax amnesties," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 383-400, December.
- Andreoni, James, 1991. "The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 143-159, July.
- Jeffrey A. Dubin & Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, 1992. "State Income Tax Amnesties: Causes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1057-1070.
- Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1987.
"Amnesty, Enforcement, and Tax Policy,"
in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 55-86
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:ntj:journl:v:46:y:1993:i:no._1:p:53-60 is not listed on IDEAS
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- repec:ntj:journl:v:43:y:1990:i:no._1:p:23-37 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alm, James & McKee, Michael J. & Beck, William, 1990. "Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(1), pages 23-37, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/222. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow)or (Hassan Zaidi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.