What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail; An Analysis of Rent Capture
Download full text from publisher
More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Governance; Rent seeking; Public sector; Transparency; incentives; wages; budget constraint; wage; fiscal transparency; fiscal management;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-08-05 (All new papers)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/146. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .